UPDATE 23. September 2021: THE CORONA CRIME NETWORK: A Massive, Globalist, Public-Private Partnership Established to Foist a New World Order

UPDATE 11. September 2021: NEVER FORGET - 09. September 2001-2021 + WATCH: COVID19/11 – Robin Monotti - Episode one of Narratives Intertwined

UPDATE 25. July 2021: I’m From The Government… Have a Small Pox Blanket

IMPORTANT: List of Hostis humanis - The Enemies of Humanity

ICYMI: THE GLOBAL HEALTH MAFIA PROTECTION RACKET + Men Who Wanted to Be Left Alone + Countering Protection Rackets Using Legal and Social Approaches: An Agent-Based Test

Black Rock: One Company to Rule Them All

Let me also introduce you to the wonderful individuals currently making most of the covid vaccines in America:Three German Billionairs.

By Mindy Robinson - 25. July 2021

What if I told you that the same people manufacturing and pushing all these untested, experimental covid vaccines…have all mass-injured and killed people before with one? Since 2021 is turning out to be the year all our “conspiracy theories” come true (and by conspiracy theory, I mean a more plausible, and educated answer than anything our government and media is currently shoving down our throats) there are a few things I thought deserved some re-investigation…and you won’t believe what I ended up uncovering.

The reluctancy of our government officials to answer even the most simple questions about the lack of election integrity, coupled with the nonsensical and unreasonable actions of hypocritical politicians over all these ridiculous covid mandates the last year (and are already re-vamping up in states like California and Nevada now for no reason other than to punish people that refuse to take an untested vaccine) have not gone unnoticed by the public.

To many people, it never made sense that forcibly locking down healthy people to protect the sick (that were already vulnerable to everything anyway) was going to do anything but devastate the country’s economy and shudder small businesses. Nor why any sane, non-evil person would purposely place sick covid patients into nursing homes to infect the most vulnerable people of us all that they claimed we were shutting down everything for in the first place. Attempts to question any of this madness on social media resulted in suspensions, shadowbans, post flags and removals, and a slew of prominent vocal dismantled accounts from General Michael Flynn to the apparently ever-so-threatening My Pillow Guy. The same social media platforms that have to be sued to remove child porn by the underaged victims themselves, have no problem focusing all their time and manpower on suppressing and removing dissenting political opinions that they disagree with, right down to the funny memes. The mainstream media has been visibly complicit across the board, as if they were all reading from the same bad script….because well, they literally are. Our corrupt judicial system who refuses to prosecute BLM and Antifa protesters who burned down buildings, assaulted officers, and looted businesses…has no problem holding Capitol protesters captive in jail for half a year now without bail or a trial, in solitary confinement, beaten by guards to the point where someone lost an eye all for the crime of “trespassing” in a building most of them were let into that their damn taxes pay for….and it’s got everyone wondering what the hell is *really* going on here? As a conservative activist I gave up on the GOP months ago for their gutlessness and refusal to stand by the American people that (supposedly) elected them. All we wanted was a forensic election audit to settle it once and for all, unite a divided nation, and assure us that our votes actually mattered…and instead I end up yelling at Lindsay Graham in an airport for going against his word and being a compete traitor. Whether you liked or hated Trump, he was doing amazing things for this country and our economy…things that were disrupting the congressional gravy train of corrupt politicians from both sides selling our country out to corporate and foreign interests to line their own pockets with kickbacks and book deals. If Biden is the “most popular president of all time” than why doesn’t it look or feel like it at all?

With the distractions of lockdowns, election fraud, censorship, and corrupt Governors across the country illegally stripping Americans of our constitutional rights “for the better good” that went on throughout most of 2020….something else more sinister and subtle was going on in the background. Black Rock, the largest investment company in the entire world was buying up every house they could get their hands on at a 20-50% markup, which of course artificially raises home values, and is already pricing out the working and middle class. It’s turning independent American homeowners into renters at the mercy of powerful, global landlords and at a heavily concerning pace. Bill Gates (who’s now the largest farmland owner in the country) and China have also bought up unusually vast amounts of prime American farmland, and it’s hard not to get the feeling that our country is quickly being sold out from underneath us.

The “Great Reset” you might have heard mentioned before, isn’t just a “conspiracy theory.” It’s an actual thing where the ultra-powerful elites of the world got together and decided how the rest of us should live. According the movement’s own website “The Great Reset is a creative industry movement to embed the positive environmental shifts that have happened during lockdown as THE new normal.” The website goes on to praise how the lockdowns that destroyed the economy were really helpful with lowering carbon emissions and greenhouse gases. Imagine thinking climate change is more important than individuals losing everything they’ve ever worked for, because clearly the “real problem” with pollution couldn’t possibly be all these foreign factories belching out toxins into the air and plastic into our oceans, while using slave labor and children to make a profit….that’s the kind of destructive, selfish, insanity we’re dealing with here.

Their mission is to not let things “go back to normal” as they once were. They are perfectly happy watching the mega-corporations they own become richer, at the cost of pushing out and buying up smaller businesses who can’t compete with the forced covid restrictions and long term mandates that politicians on these company’s payrolls are unconstitutionally pushing on us. If what they were doing were truly about helping the environment…then why isn’t China (who’s by far the largest polluter on the planet) mentioned anywhere on their site? China just got caught working with Fauci to create this same bioweapon called Covid-19 that they’re currently using to control the world, so yea…I bet you want to forget about their role in this, how Biden is in bed with China, and that that’s why the FBI and the media covered up Hunter’s laptop until after the election. Another movement related the Great Reset, is Agenda 21….which is also not just a “conspiracy theory.” It’s an institution that’s been around since the 1970’s, but only came to fruition when Bush Sr. signed onto it at the 1992 Earth Summit. Bill Clinton would go on to continue the program as it was passed as a “soft law” that it didn’t go through Congress like it should have (because it would honestly have never passed and people would have started grabbing pitchforks and torches if they knew what it was really about.) Agenda 21’s mission is for the world’s governments to end individual freedom for the good of the “community” and to seize control of all land, properties, and homes because human beings just aren’t doing a “good enough job” taking care of the earth on their own. Sounds like extreme communism to me….actually, it sounds a lot worse than extreme communism as there won’t be any other country to run to, as their intention is to make this grey, dystopian future hell global. In their world there will be an ultra elite class to rule over and make all the decisions, and a serf class of worker bees that will “own nothing and be happy.” I’m not kidding either, here’s the World Economic Forum’s ungodly video about it here:

They see the middle class as a waste of resources, and firmly believe that the human population needs to be reduced dramatically and rapidly. If you can tell me how that can be done that doesn’t involve some genocidal idea like…oh, I don’t know, manipulating a virus to become more contagious and deadly, while pushing a “vaccine” that seems to be killing more people than curing anything, let me know. Almost every drug commercial I’ve ever seen has had a warning about not taking it if you’re pregnant…but not this experimental, barely tested, and can’t be held legally liable if it kills or injures you covid vaccine. We’ve got reports rolling in of miscarriages and stillbirths in multiple countries and the media is trying to ignore it. Then you look at whose pushing the vaccine and making money on it, and you’ve got the same people involved over and over again…Fauci, Big Pharma and Bill Gates with his omnipresent Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation pushing this barely tested vaccine. Well, at least it got the people that were scared of covid to ease up on the lockdowns, right? I’m sure they’re totally not going to come up with a new wave or “variant” that they intend to use to keep people forcibly locked down in perpetuity or anything (cough, cough, delta/lambda/some other bullshit variant.)

Speaking of pointless yet damaging lockdowns, let’s get back to “why” Fauci decided to lie and shut this country down in the first place. Is he just some weird, ego-driven maniac enjoying the attention on the world’s stage, or his he a powerful puppet for something darker? Think about who stands to gain the most out of a manufactured pandemic…ah, that’s right…the vaccine manufacturers themselves. They don’t even have to spend money advertising for their product either, because the government’s using $250 million dollars of our own tax money to fight “vaccine hesitancy” because God forbid people want to see if the long term side effects are worse than the virus itself. That’s on top of all the bribes from mega-corporations to convince people to take it and illegal mandates by employers and venues as well. Social media and the mainstream news have actively hid and suppressed mentions of vaccine side effects and deaths, even going as far as dismantling accounts and entire discussion groups for discussing their own personal experiences. Personally, I’d like to know why Facebook’s independent 3rd party covid fact-checker site is funded by billions in Johnson & Johnson stock. Seems like it’s just a site pushing its own propaganda and self interest, but what do I know I’m a “conspiracy theorist” to them. Zuckerberg already spent over $350 million dollars of his own money to openly steer an election in his favor, and now they’re finding election fraud in every county he funded…so I’m pretty sure him immorally pushing an experimental vaccine down people’s throats wouldn’t be beyond the realm of possibilities for that him to do.

So who actually does produce covid vaccines in the United States? Well, you’ve got these 3 German billionaires who just made even more billions producing the Pfizer vaccine for BioNTech.


German Billionair Uğur Şahin (here wih CFO Sean Marett - left), and the firm’s largest investors, the German billionaire brothers Thomas and Andreas Struengmann ran the PfizerBioNTech racket with German Fuad El-Hibri (Emergent BioSolutions)

You’ve also got Sanofi which produces the vaccine for Moderna (but we’ll get back to these two companies later for an interesting twist.) Now here’s where it gets really interesting….both the AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson vaccines are produced by the exact same manufacturer in America, called Emergent BioSolutions (formerly BioPort.) Without a bidding war or even shopping around, Emergent was magically bestowed by the lucrative contract to be the sole producer of both company’s vaccines. Want to guess what the only other marketable product this company has ever produced in their entire corporate history was? Biothrax….the failed anthrax vaccine that the government forced onto our service members during a “mandatory vaccination” period 20 years ago to their physical detriment and whose long term effects are the main suspect behind Gulf war syndrome that effects 25-30% of veterans that served at that time. This toxic injection was sold at price gouging profit of 300%, despite the fact it was government subsidized….that’s right, they robbed us blind by producing a product we paid for and was then made mandatory for the military.

Know and let me introduce you to the wonderful individuals currently making most of the covid vaccines in America:

Meet Fuad El-Hibri a German citizen of Lebanese decent, he’s the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Emergent BioSolutions, he also has ties to Osama Bin Laden and only became a US citizen because someone at the Pentagon thought it was a “bad look” to put a foreign national in charge of our military vaccine stockpiles. Yea, no kidding.

BioPort/Emergent also holds the honor of being headed by Admiral William J. Crowe the former Head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Back when Bush senior was President and setting up Osama Bin Laden as a “freedom fighter,” Admiral Crowe and his associates were according to many reports, selling American made weapons-grade Anthrax to Saddam Hussein in the hopes that he would use it against Iran. How’d that turn out for you, Bub?

Now meet Jerome Hauer, the Independent Director of Emergent BioSolutions and a major stock holder, who also happens to be suspected in having a hand in both 9/11 and the subsequent “anthrax mail scare” that occurred just weeks after.

Think I’m kidding? You see, Jerome Hauer had an office in building 7 of the World Trade Center…you know, the building full of important paperwork for things like the $2.3 trillion dollars Donald Rumsfeld announced the government “lost” the day before 9/11, and files on the Safari Club (the clandestine arm of the CIA) that collapsed in on itself in the attack despite not having been hit by a plane or debris, being heavily steel fortified, and fell down for absolutely no reason according to architectural experts from across the world.

Don’t worry about Hauer though, he decided not to go to work that morning…although he did manage to make it on TV that day with Dan Rather to declare this was the work of Osama Bin Laden…before anyone in the government had even said anything about it. The same cannot be said of Bin Laden terrorist expert John O’Neill who was hired by Hauer the day before, and killed helping people trapped on 9/11 on his first day of work. Weird how the only guy that would know if Bin Laden really did this, died on his first day of work on 9/11 *and* was hired by the guy trying to now blame Bin Laden for it. Is now a good time to mention that Jerome Hauer was also the head of security for the entire World Trade Center complex, and that if anyone had access to send in teams to demo the buildings to guarantee them all to fall, it would be him? He was also obsessed with collapsed buildings and had pictures of them all over his office, because that’s normal. Planes hit the towers that day, it was on live TV and people across Manhattan saw it. Now as to whether that would cause the towers to collapse in on themselves when they were specifically designed to withstand not just one plane crash but multiple (including like I said Building 7 which wasn’t hit or even right next to the towers) or whether our government “really” lost track of the terrorists when they were on to them the first time, I can’t say. But it did pull America back into war, and the murderous beast that is the military industrial complex began booming again at the cost of American tax payer’s money and lives. If the idea of our government faking an incident to drag the country into war for money seems like “too much” for you, let me remind you that President Johnson did that exact same very thing (we know now from declassified documents) when he pulled the United States into the Vietnam War by using the nonexistent Gulf of Tonkin incident to get war powers granted to him by Congress. Something I highly doubt President Kennedy would have ever done…which Johnson infamously replaced upon a well known conspiracy theory all it’s own.

But I digress, I have to mention the fact that both Fuad El-Hibri and Jerome Hauer of BioPort/Emergent BioSolutions, were both suspected of being behind the Anthrax mailing scare of 2011 that sickened 17, and killed 5. Turns out there’s a really short list of people that would even have access to military grade Anthrax and be able to safely handle it…and an even shorter list of who would actually profit from such a thing. Originally the FBI tried to blame Iran, as another part of that “weapons of mass destruction” tale they loved pushing in the Middle East that turned out not to have never existed, but man…it sure got us into some expensive wars that the military industrial complex made a lot of money off of. The “blame Iran” theory was pushed out personally by perpetual war mongerer Senator John McCain, because well…of course. Investigative journalists on the other hand were looking at Fuad and Hauer, although the FBI eventually rested blame on microbiologist Bruce Ivins, a biodefense researcher for the US Army’s infectious disease lab for 18 years. The FBI had no proof Ivins ever did anything other than work at the lab, and he had absolutely no motive to harm is fellow Americans whatsoever. Newspapers at the time (journalism wasn’t always dead) were in an uproar on how flimsy the FBI’s case was and demandedan independent investigation into it. Here’s just one publication and its theory all about the Anthrax mailings…read it and tell me if anything sounds eerily familiar?

What if I told you, that despite the year long narrative by the media about how these are “unprecedented times” with all this endless disease fear mongering, and all this pushing experimental vaccines and scaring the hell public to control them…all happened 20 years ago?

What if I also told you that the same people that were involved then…are involved now? With the entire covid 19 pandemic narrative falling to pieces due to the recent release of Dr. Fauci’s damning emails, it’s got a lot of people wondering “Why the hell did this guy just lie to an entire country, knowing he was wrecking lives by doing it?” Fauci admitted in emails that store bought masks didn’t work, but he made people wear them to the detriment of their health anyway. He stated he knew lockdowns didn’t workand asymptomatic people weren’t contagious….but he forced people to shudder their businesses, miss weddings and funerals, and destroyed the country’s economy over nothing anyway. Then there’s the fact it turns out that he was the main person behind the “gain of function” (AKA the turning of coronavirus into a bioweapon) by funding the illegal work using our tax money with our foreign enemy China. Forget about pulling his book from shelves….why isn’t this guy on trial for crimes against humanity? He knew it came out the Wuhan lab, it was the exact human manufactured virus strain they were working on there, and it was their researchers that were the first to get sick (which they also hid for months)….but he covered it up and blamed it on“bat soup” just so that people wouldn’t think it was all his fault? How this guy is even able to walk around without mobs coming after him for killing their friends and family, I do not know.

Keep in mind, these infamous Fauci emails also revealed that Mark Zuckerberg offered to push Fauci’s fear mongering covid narrative all over on Facebook and Instagram, using the fact checkers both he and the Communist Party of China personally fund (no, I’m not kidding) to suspend people and flag every post that dared to question if masks work or of the vaccine was really safe. The fervor in which social media, politicians, mega-corporations, and Big Pharma have been pushing an untested, experimental injection onto the populous…one that has harmed and killed more people in the last few months than all other vaccines combined in the last two decades…is the most immoral thing I’ve ever witnessed in my entire life…and of course, it’s all done under the direction and “blessing” of Dr. Fauci himself.

Speaking of, you want to know who jumped to the defense and downplayed the Anthrax vaccine catastrophe when our military members were getting sick and injured? You guessed it, Dr. Fauci. While most people are familiar with his AIDS epidemic failure:

He was also responsible for covering up and making light of the Anthrax vaccine injuries still affecting our military to this day. By the way, want to know what the side effects of this anthrax vaccine are?

That’s right, the same side effects they had for the Anthrax vaccine, are almost the same side effects they’re having now for all these covid vaccines. Keep in mind, these are just the “short term” effects. I do love how long term effects have been declared “safe” in children despite it being humanly impossible know at this point:

Service members left in droves to avoid this mandatory being shoved in their veins, others were not so lucky.

Fauci’s official response to the Anthrax fail was to claim they “solved” it by preemptively pumping people full of unhealthy antibiotics to fight it, “We already know that we prevented a serious problem on the Hill by essentially blanket-treating people with [Cipro]. We know that because when we went back and did surveys, we found that many people who had absolutely no symptoms were actually exposed.”

This Cipro “cure” by the way, that was pushed out by Fauci over cheaper and safer products, is produced by Bayer…you know, the company that got caught and sued for knowingly giving hemophiliacs HIV in the 80’s. Clearly this is a company whose first concern is people’s health, am I right? Because of Fauci’s not so good recommendation, Cipro in return was able to price gouge their drug, which I’m sure had *nothing* to do with his decision.

Is now also a good time to mention that Jerome Hauer of Emergent Biosolutions also warned government officials like his friend Dick Cheney to preemptively take Cipro in case there was an “Anthrax scare” ….a week before the anthrax letters went out to members of the media and government? Anthrax isn’t an easy nor effective “bioweapon” if you’re wondering, which makes his “recommendation” even more suspect. Even Fauci himself later admitted Anthrax isn’t that viable or effective as a terrorist weapon when compared to bombs or anything else really.

But wait, there’s more…Jerome Hauer also actively participated in the Dark Winter simulation that predicted all this in the first place.

That’s right, so the guy currently producing most of our covid vaccines had the specific and unusual means to be behind the original anthrax mailing scare to push a poorly tested vaccine, the personal financial motive, had practiced that scenario in particular, and apparent psychic abilities to know it was going to happen a week before it did…but the FBI decided to blame it on a lab worker instead. The whole Anthrax mailing investigation, unfortunately died with Ivins who committed “suicide” before he could make it to trial (and likely clear his name) and the FBI simply “rested” their case. Ivins didn’t have a motive to mail out Anthrax….but you know who did? The guy who’s company was going under until an Anthrax scare had the government buying his whole stockpile of BioThrax. If you’re wondering why no one else ever made a better vaccine….I can tell you they tried. The government wasted $877.5 million of our tax dollars on a company called VaxGen. They had spent four years developing a new anthrax vaccine, and the contract threatened Emergent’s business. Since BioThrax was the company’s only financially successful product, it would become obsolete if VaxGen succeeded in making a better one. So what did they do? They hired an army of 50 high powered lobbyists to bribe congressmen etc. to make the case that a new vaccine was a gamble and that the nation’s safety depended on buying more of Emergent’s crappy product (Emergent would later go on to buy this new vaccine for themselves after paying lobbyists to trash it.) Dr. Philip K. Russell, a vaccinologist and retired Army general who was a senior biodefense official in the Bush administration, described the outcome as “a big, dramatic failure. National security took a back seat to politics and the power of lawyers and lobbyists.” He believed that if officials had given the company more time instead of folding to lobbyists, it would have likely resulted in a better cure for anthrax exposure.

Yet despite all the conspiracies, dirty politics, sickened people, and ultimate failure, Emergent Biosolutions managed to win not one…but two exclusive contracts to produce covid vaccines. They didn’t even shop around for a better company either, they went with Emergent without any competitive bidding. Well, at least they’re doing a great job this time, right?

Nope. They paid themselves huge bonuses while their factories were so disgusting and contaminated that the FDA forced them to throw out 100 million doses of AstraZeneca and 60 million doses of Johnson & Johnson. Speaking of wasting money, let’s go over just how much this failed, corrupt company made through American tax payers through their lobbyists and dirty back deals. Here are the highlights, but you can read a more in-depth look from the original article here:

  • BioPort (Emergent’s) contract with the Pentagon provided for $45.1 million, including $16 million in immediate cash for plant renovations. The deal required the government to pay for the vaccine even if the drugs weren’t licensed for use, nine months later BioPort was still struggling to get FDA approval. When BioPort/Emergent went back to the Pentagon for money, Pentagon auditors looked at BioPort’s books and concluded that millions of dollars were “unaccounted” for. Originally the Pentagon DENIED their additional request for funding for a bail out, but in September of 1999 Pentagon contract officers, citing the “interests of national security” overruled them and approved a $24.1 million bailout. In addition to the bail out, contingencies were added and granted demanding that the government pay all the company’s debts and provided a 144 percent increase in payment for each anthrax vaccine dose from $4.36 to $10.64. At no point in time was congress made aware of this “deal.” Upon hearings held by Sen. John Warner R-VA and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Congress uncovered that El-Hibri Fuad and his partners had invested only $4.5 million of their own money in cash and loan guarantees for the entire deal. Admiral Crowe invested no money at all. In a written statement according to Rep. Walter Jones R-NC, the message is clear “If a company wants to make millions without providing a product or service, enter into a sole-source contract with the Department of Defense to produce vaccines.” For 3 years BioPort/Emergent struggled to get licensing for its plant and product. Meanwhile, batches of vaccine were still being made, and the Pentagon paid for the bill…including storage of all the unusable vaccines. By 2000, even the Pentagon had lost patience and told BioPort to stop making vaccines until the plant regained its license. But the military agreed to keep paying their bills, just to keep the company afloat. The Pentagon ultimately had paid BioPort $126 million for an anthrax vaccine that was stored and unlicensed. They also paid $33.5 million during that time for this damaging vaccine to be mandatorily given to 525,000 troops. By August 2001, the Pentagon finally publicly stated that they were considering abandoning BioPort for all its failures, but one month later came 9/11 and the infamous “Anthrax attacks” which as previously stated, saved BioPort and turned 2 prominent members of the company into main suspects. After only a few months, BioPort was mysteriously out of money again, their new goal was to win the $1 billion dollar contract the government was waiving in front of pharmaceutical companies (at the time the largest in government history) to supply millions of doses of anthrax vaccine for use by civilians, and government workers. Meanwhile, while the company was floundering at the tax payers expense and millions were already missing, BioPort President El Hibri Fuad and his wife were in the news because their neighbors were complaining about the 88-acre commercial equestrian and polo center they were building near their home in Gaithersburg, MD. right near Washington DC. On the anniversary of 9/11, six doctors, scientists and former military officers put together by BioPort and described as a “panel of bioterrorism experts” announced the need for preparedness. Their recommendation of course was to not rely on a new anthrax vaccine, but to purchase millions of doses of BioPort’s already proven faulty product instead. By September 2003, the Pentagon was paying $22 a dose….more than double the price negotiated in the original 1999 bailout. In 2003 BioPort became a subsidiary of Emergent BioSolutions led by El-Hibri, and by the end of 2003, Emergent signed a new contract with the Pentagon, worth anywhere from $29.7 million to $245 million, depending on how many vaccines they made and sold. Apparently the government wasn’t done pissing away our money and eventually awarded the $1 billion dollar contract to Emergent’s competitor VaxGen, a California company without a licensed product that was already in trouble for their misreporting financial results. Emergent’s response was to hire an army of lobbyists, and within six months and $140,000 in lobbying fees won BioPort a $122.7 million contract to supply 5 million doses of the vaccine to the Department of Health and Human Services, and created a domestic stockpile of their vaccine. Four days before the big contract was awarded, one of their main lobbyist John Hishta bragged that the company paid him $30,000 for “procuring” the government contract for anthrax vaccine. As we speak, Emergent is under investigation for mismanagement and and why 160 million doses of covid vaccines had to be thrown out due to negligent contamination….but only because the powers that be are trying to blame the Trump administration. My kingdom for them to dig in only to realize that not only does this all go back to Bush, but that the corruption is occurring between Big Pharma, lobbyists, and corrupt politicians on both sides.

Would you like to know who the major stock holder for Emergent Biosolutions and all this corrupt bullshit is?

Black Rock. That’s right, the same people profiting off the pandemic by buying up everyone’s homes and watching their mega-corporations out compete all the local and small businesses…are also the exact same people selling this dangerous “cure” that doesn’t work….again.

Want to know who the major stock holders are of the only other two companies making covid vaccines (Moderna and Pfizer) in America are?

That’s right, Black Rock owns them too. Want to guess who the largest shareholder of Black Rock itself is? Vanguard (who’s also listed on all of them.) That’s right, these “different” mega-companies are all really owned by the same people. Vanguard is also rooted in Rockefeller money….you know, the people behind pushing all this globalist trash in the first place so they can rule over the rest of us like peasants and serfs. Funny how the exact same people pushing socialism on the rest of us, have no problem hoarding everything they own for themselves, while buying up everything they just took from us.

Do you see now what’s happening in the world, and why everything has been so screwed up with our for-sale-to-the-highest-bidder government as of late? Of course to pull something like this off, one would have to completely control the narrative. We already know the two radical leftists that own Facebook and Twitter, have no problem playing defense to this plan. What do they care, they’ll be enjoying life as one of the global ultra-elite. But to truly pull off and control the narrative on a scam this global and in-depth, one would also have to own or control both sides of the mainstream media.

Oh, wait they do. Black Rock/Vanguard are currently the top two owners of Time Warner, Comcast, Disney (FOX) and News Corp, four of the six media companies that control more than 90% of the U.S. media landscape. Funny how all this controlled covid and vaccine fear mongering sounds just like what happened with the 2020 election, and how mainstream media refused to report on any of the visible, rampant fraud while social media banned anyone from talking about it….oh wait, that’s right, guess who’s sitting on Biden’s administration in important positions that allow them to make even more ungodly blood money now….Black Rock.

Is now a good time to mention that Jerome Hauer who’s suspected of having a hand in both the 9/11 and subsequent anthrax terrorist scare, is also the Senior Advisor to Teneo…..you know, the corrupt powerhouse linked to the Clintons, Hunan Abedin, child trafficking in Haiti (because its normal that Bill Clinton was sent by Hillary to personally get a child trafficker out of jail, right) and their global political money laundering scheme that is the Clinton Foundation. Isn’t it “funny” how the same goddamn people are involved with everything sinister and dirty in the world? It’s almost has if there’s been a Cabal of a global crime syndicate of evil elites using their money to buy political leverage to make more money and control people, or something? Oh wait, here’s TIME magazine openly admitting that a Cabal (their words, not mine) that used their fame, money, and influence to rig, er I mean “fortify” the 2020 election. I’m so glad we were all “conspiracy theorists” for saying the exact same thing while it was happening. Back to Teneo, here’s a link to an expose of just how corrupt the company is, and how the Clintons used it to gain even more power, influence, and money by a left leaning, anti-Trump website, so it can’t be excused away as political bias: https://washingtonbabylon.com/nothing-to-see-here-just-total-corrupt-relationship-between-clinton-foundation-and-teneo/amp/

The “Deep State” isn’t Obama, the Bush’s, or even the Clintons….they are simply the useful, no-problem-being-corrupt-and-evil puppets of these conglomerate monsters. The military industrial complex and the mega asset companies that own them, make unbelievable money off unending wars and the deaths of American soldiers, and their lobbyists make damn sure the right political people and government alphabet agencies are in their pocket to keep that war machine grinding for profit unimpeded.

So to some it up, Rockefeller money owns Vanguard, who owns Black Rock, who owns all these covid vaccines, who owns the government officials and companies needed to push it on people, all the media companies they need to control the vaccine narrative, and pretty much everything else you buy or use in some way…and it’s all being boosted along by Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey, Soros-funded politicians, the Clinton Foundation, and Bill Gates. What could go wrong?

Or better yet, what can we do? If you boycott Coke for their “woke” policies and chose Pepsi products instead….let me tell you, they’re owned by the same companies and share holders as well. Not only does Black Rock/Vanguard own large stocks of nearly all the major companies in the world, but also the stocks of the investors in those companies as well. This gives them a complete monopoly over the global economy. We as consumers have no real say in where our money goes anymore and who we actually support….it’s an optional illusion because it’s all owned by the same damn people. We are all being played on a scale never seen before.

So how do we fix it? The reason monopolies are dangerous is because it kills capitalism and blocks competition. Technology only grows and improves when there’s a reason to be better than the other guy. It can also get into some scary territory as a monopoly can price gouge and do whatever the hell they want because they’re literally the only option to people. But we’re not talking about one phone company owning a monopoly this time….we’re talking about a few elite people and companies owning almost everything valuable in the entire world….and now they’re openly talking about instilling their own global government via the UN. Keep in mind these are the same people and mega-companies that are pushing for the “Great Reset” and “Agenda 21” that mean to enslave us all.

The only thing that’s going to save the world economy at this point is to hold these mega-companies responsible for the global coup they’re attempting to pull off. They don’t care if people live in miserable poverty, they’ve been making money hand over fist doing that to 3rd world and communist country slave workers for decades. They don’t care if people die, they’ve been selling poison to us for years and getting away with it.

The only thing that can really be done at this point is to completely dismantle everything Vanguard and their shelf companies own and control as a global monopoly…and make sure it goes back to the People in their respective countries and not just back into one of their thousands of shelf companies. We need purge our government of these corrupt politicians under the control of these companies….and that starts with demanding a nationwide forensic election audit to see who’s really supposed to be holding these seats.

Side note: I’m currently working with a nonpartisan group pushing for a forensic audit in Nevada using our state constitutional right to one. Since we’re basically asking corrupt politicians to investigate themselves for fraud, we are being ignored and even threatened. Please take the time to read our official response and help us spread the word and put pressure on them until they buckle: https://thedcpatriot.com/nevadans-respond-to-state-officials-threats-of-felonies-against-them-for-demanding-election-audit/


Mindy Robinson

Since I’ve kicked off Twitter and censored on Facebook for posting proof of voter fraud, you can follow me either through my telegram https://t.me/AmericanAFMindyRobinson or uncensored on GAB which you can bookmark through the DuckDuckGo app for easy access at @AmericanAFMindy






A Massive, Globalist, Public-Private Partnership Established to Foist a New World Order

Posted by State of the Nation - 23. September 2021

Continue reading at:


The Germans and Germany had been chosen by the WEF, the PharMafia and the corporations as reliable serfs to function as the key in launching the Corona Crime racket worldwide.


















11. September 2001-2021

WATCH: COVID19/11 – Robin Monotti

Episode one of Narratives Intertwined

COVID19/11: Narratives Intertwined is OffG’s new series of short interviews with prominent voices in the alternate media, vocal Covid sceptics and leading figures in the 9/11 truth movement.

The series is intended to both mark the 20th anniversary of the World Trade Center collapse, and discuss how that event helped shape the modern world and, in turn, set the stage for the Covid “pandemic”.

The first episode features architect and prominent lockdown-sceptic Robin Monotti.

Robin discusses why he first began to doubt the official narrative on Covid, his “red pill moment” on 9/11, the importance of finding truly independent experts on all things, and more.

You can follow Robin’s telegram channel here, or read more about the Monotti protocol here.


I’m From The Government… Have a Small Pox Blanket

By john - 28. July 2021

Dear Friends,

It seems to me, the likely reason the Biden administration is sending covid positive illegal immigrants into our communities, is to increase the rate of covid. That’s pretty obvious. It was recently discovered that the feds released dozens of covid positive people into Texas, who immediately went to a Wattaburger, to have a patty melt, fries and spread the Wuhan flu. Someone with situational awareness might think the feds did that to increase the corona rate in Texas, as punishment for not mandating masks or lockdowns. Of course, problem reaction solution, they could be planning on making covid really bad in Texas and Florida, then using their manufactured suffering to justify clamping down, and vilifying their political enemies for following our Constitution. Those doing that… are monsters.

The ethics of forcing citizens to get an experimental shot, that has never been successfully tested in animals, while at the same time, importing people riddled with the Kung flu, and distributing them to states that are politically inconvenient… cannot be said to be human hearted. Perhaps they could be better characterized as the morality of a demon, imp or bureaucrat. A core concept of right and wrong is the idea of equal treatment. It is patently unequal to allow people you know have a disease into the country, then distribute them, while at the same time, screaming from the rooftops how dangerous this disease is, and that we must loose our Rights, else we will all die. On the one hand instilling fear as a means of control, while peppering the population with the very pestilence they push to panic us.

The government is releasing people who are clearly sick with Corona into our communities. No matter how you come at the question, it’s a quandary. Seriously. If the Wuhan flu is as bad as they say, why would they encourage people sick with it, to come here, then release them into our neighborhoods, untreated, unvaccinated and unfettered? While forcing vaccines and masks on citizens. The two actions are at odds with each other. Moreover, the very people doing these illogical things, claim to be the experts, who are non-emotional, benevolent, and obviously… follow the science. Isn’t that like forcing everyone in your house to wash their hands, while pouring raw sewage on the counters, china and silverware? Anyone claiming I am comparing immigrants to raw sewage… seeks to avoid the real point.

The only sane answer is, the elite distributing illegal immigrants, like small pox blankets, have an agenda. They are not stupid even though they act it. They are diabolical. How evilis it to exploit a disease to force political change? Because, we all know in our hearts, that is what this is about. Not wasting an emergency, to finally shred the US Constitution, so the elite can get on with the hard job of oppression. If they have to raise the death toll by infecting old folks homes with the Corona, oh well… they’re old anyway. If importing the Wuhan flu to counter the vaccine pogrom, if it actually prevents the disease at all, will keep the fear elevated, then all the better. In the private sector, we have terms for people who do these things, swindler, fraud and charlatan. There are other less flattering words as well.

We know it is happening because it is all around us, we have caught them red handed, and heck, they as much as admit it. This has become an ugly truth it is mortal to overlook. People are dying from the “vaccine,” disease, kids committing suicide, economic turmoil, vaccine Marks, and malevolent leadership forging the way. Back to a time when folks were chattel to their lords, we had to eat bugs, you needed papers to travel, and people died from a cut. That is progress to our overlords. The chaos, fear and tyranny that Sars 2 Cov 19 has infected the world with, is priceless. It is the very problem they needed, to get the reaction they wanted, and implement their final solution. I don’t know what it is, but judging by the crimes against humanity they are doing to get it… it must be pretty monstrous indeed.


John Pepin



Hostis humani generis

For each of the following persons at least one criminal case file exists, Arrest warrants for some individuals are already issued by some jurisdictions. STATUS 26. September 2021

Dr. Anthony Stephen Fauci and Christine Grady (NIH), Dr. Ralph Steven Baric [University of North Carolina (UNC)], Prof. Dr. Shi Zhengli, Xingyi Ge (WIV/UNC), Yuan Zhiming (WIV), Dr. Peter Daszak (EH), Christopher M. Curtis, Boyd Yount, Prof. Dr. Charles M. Lieber, Yanqing Ye (PLA, now at Harvard); Zaosong Zheng, Dr. Francis Collins (NIH), David Franz, Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Thomas Inglesby, W. Ian Lipkin, Kanta Subbarao, Prof. Dr. Christian Heinrich Maria Drosten (Charité), Georg F. Gao (Chinese CDC), Xi Jinping (CCP), Prof. Xu DezhongMajor General Wei Chen, Li Feng, Jian-cheng Qi, Mao-sheng Yao, Geng-feng Zheng An-Qi Zhang, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng, Dr. N'Da Konan Michel Yao (exNML / WHO), Dr. Matthew Gillmore (ex Canadian NML [National Microbiology Laboratory - BSL-4 Winnipeg Lab]), Simon Wain-Hobson (Institut Louis Pasteur), Kizzmekia "KizzyShanta Corbett Ph.D (Harvard), Elizabeth Alexandra Mary Windsor [aka Elizabeth II], Charles Philip Arthur George Windsor [aka Prince of Wales], Bertie Ross, Dr. Vanessa Mayatt, William M. Thompson, Prof. Klaus Martin Schwab [aka Klaus Schwab] (WEF / YGL / Harvard Wyss Foundation), Melinda Gates and William Henry Gates III [aka Bill Gates] (BMGF - Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and with Seth Berkley ID2020), Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus (WHO), Dr. Angela Dorothea Merkel [née Kasner] and Joachim Sauer (Leoplodina)Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen [née Ursula Gertrud Albrecht, alias Rose Ladson] (EU - European Commission), Prof. Dr. Victor Dzau (GPMB, NAM), Dr. Chris Elias (GPMB / BMGF / Global Fund), Elhadj As Sy (GPMB), Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, Matt Hancock and Neil Ferguson (UK), Dr Bryan Charleston (Pirbright Institute), Charles George Eustice [MP], Frank Zacharias Robin Goldsmith, [alias Zac Goldsmith, aka Baron Goldsmith of Richmond Park], Rebecca Faye Clark [aka Rebecca Pow], Richard Henry Ronald Benyon, Baron Benyon [MP]Victoria Mary Boswell Prentis, Tamara Margaret Finkelstein (Defra - Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), Emmanuel Jean-Michel Frédéric Macron and Jean Castex (France), Stewart Thomas Cole (Institut Pasteur), Justin Pierre James Trudeau and Dr. Theresa Tam (Canada), Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel), as well as David John Hurley, Scott John Morrison, Daniel Andrews and Kerry Chant (Australia), Jacinda Kate Laurell Ardern (NZ), Sergio Mattarella (Italy), Mario Draghi (Italy/EZB), Sebastian Kurz (Austria), António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres (UN), Dr. Soumya Swaminathan (WHO), Henrietta H. Holsman Fore (UNICEF), Dr. Michael Ryan (WHO), Filippo Grandi (UNHCR), Jens Georg Spahn (Global Health Hub Germany, BGM / BRD) and Karl Lauterbach (MdB BRD), Ilona Kickbusch and Hans-Ulrich Holtherm (BGM), Peter Piot (EMA / Gates Foundation Senior Fellow) and Heidi Larson (VCP), Emer Cooke (EMA), EFPIA, Seth Berkley (GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance), Jane Halton and Richard J. Hatchett (CEPI - Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations), the Chief Scientific Adviser UK-Gov. (GCSA) - responsible for the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) and its misinformation outlet, the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Behaviours (SPI-B) - Christine Madeleine Odette Lagarde [née Lallouette] (EZB/ECB), David Malpass (WorldBank), IFC (International Finance Corporation), GFF – Global Financing Facility (World Bank), Kristalina Ivanova Georgieva-Kinova (IMF), Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW), Christoph Benn, Peter Sands, Jeffrey Sachs, Amir Attaran and Mohammed Pate (The Global Fund), Stefanie Tompkins and Nathan D. Wolfe (DARPA), Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. and Jen PsakiDonald John Trump, Barack Hussein Obama, George Walker Bush, Jorge Mario Bergoglio [alias Pope Francis], Jair Messias Bolsonaro, Nathaniel Charles Jacob Rothschild, Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild, David René James de Rothschild, Warren Edward Buffett, Rajiv "Raj" J. Shah, Abigail Aldrich Rockefeller, Henry Alfred Kissinger [born Heinz Alfred Kissinger], George Soros [born György Schwartz] (Open Society Foundation), Rob Kapito and Laurence "Larry" Douglas Fink (BlackRock), Mortimer J. "Tim" Buckley (The Vanguard Group), Joseph L. Hooley and Ron O'Hanley (State Street), Abigail Johnson (Fidelity Investments), Ann Tatlock (Fiduciary Trust), Marcus Wallenberg, Jacob Wallenberg and Peter Wallenberg Jr. ('The Wallenberg Sphere' incl. Investor AB, FAM - Foundtion Asset Management, Patricia Industries, Wallenberg Investments AB and providing Vaxx-passports)Elon Reeve Musk (Neuralink Corp. and OpenAI, SpaceX), Richard Charles Nicholas Branson (Virgin), Jeffrey Preston Bezos [née Jorgensen] (Amazon), Lawrence Edward Page, Sergey Mikhaylovich Brinn John Leroy Hennessy and Pichai Sundararajan (aka Sundar Pichai) (Alphabet  / Google), Arthur D. Levinson (Apple), Satyanarayana Nadella and Bradford Lee Smith (Microsoft), Mark Elliot Zuckerberg (FaceBook), Michael Rubens Bloomberg (Bloomberg), Peter Thiel and Alex Carp (Palantir), Neuralink co-founder Max Hodak and Mt Gox founder Jed Caleb (Science Corp), Jack Ma Yun (Alibaba Group), Mark Joseph Carney (UN / Stripe), Rochelle P. Walensky, Anne Schuchat, Sherri A. Berger, Mitchell Wolfe, Jeff Reczek (Centers for Disease Control - CDC), Janet Woodcock, Taylor Lee (FDA), Xavier Becerra, Rachel Lavine (HHS-USA), Jeff Ziens and Andy Slavitt (U.S. Gov. Adm.), Margaret Ann "Peggy" Hamburg (American Association for the Advancement of Science - AAAS), Dr. med.vet. Lothar Heinz Wieler (Robert Koch Institute - RKI, Germany), Susanne Klatte [née Quandt] (ENTRUST, ALTANA, sg carbon), Stéphane Bancel, Tal Zaks (Moderna), Albert Bourla [Greek: Άλμπερτ Μπουρλά], Mikael Dolsten and Scott Gottlieb (Pfizer/BioNTech) plus Uğur Şahin, Özlem Türeci, Sean Marett, Sierk Poetting and Ryan Richardson as well as Thomas and Andreas Struengmann (BioNTech) plus Fuad El-Hibri, Jerome Hauer and Admiral William J. Crowe (Emergent BioSolutions), Leif Johansson (Astra-Zeneca/Oxford), Julia Eileen Gillard and Jeremy James Farrar (Wellcome Trust), Jonathan Symonds and Emma Walmsley (GlaxoSmithKline [GSK]), Ronald Brus and Jan Pieter Oosterveld (Janssen  Vaccines), Pascal Soriot (Teva Pharmaceuticals), Alex Gorsky and Paul Stoffels (Johnson & Johnson), as well as the heads of Sanofi plus their several coronavirus patent holding biotech companies; Leonard. S. Schleifer (Regeneron Pharma), and the heads of Merck (incl. former Themis team), COVAX, FIND (Global Alliance for Diagnostics), Medicines & Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRG), Swiss Agency For Therapeutic Products, PATH, CARB-X, GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit - formerly GTZ), WGAH (Washington Global Health Alliance), IVI (International Vaccine Institute), IFPMA - International Federation of Pharmceutical Manufacturers and Associations, CGD - Center for Global Development, Ridgeback, Gilea, Sherlock Biosciences, BBSRC / SERCO, UKRI, Neural Lace, Starlink, Boston Dynamics, Booz Allen HamiltonManTech International, Tectonix and Freescale Semiconductor, plus 256 other corporations, including the heads of NGOs, like Bono (ONE), data.org, compromised Change.org, NTI - Nuclear Threat Initiative, CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dennis Carroll (GVP - Global Virome Project); and the corrupted mainstream media, like CNN, Xinhua, BBC, CBC, AlJazeera, ABC, ARD, ZDF, Reuters, AP, Vox, their fake journalists and 'experts'  like Dr. Leana Wen (CNN) as well as the fake 'Fact-Checkers' ranging from PolitiFact and the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH), FullFact, FactCheck, to the outsourced AFP-Factcheck and down to low-lives like 'Volksverpetzer' (nomen est omen), Wikipedia, Psiram and the George Soros co-financed 'Correctiv', must be brought before an independent international tribunal for the Corona crimes immediately, in addition to the long overdue trials before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for violations of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and the Nuremberg Code, and before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) - if there is still a sovereign nation that can and actually will file a case with the ICJ - as the USA and China are waging a war of aggression in form of a global war with biological weapons. 

(Compiled by: International Consortium of Advovates on the Corona Crimes)

The three transnational Corona/GreatReset criminal complexes:

A) Financial Complex

B) Medical Complex

C) Technical Complex

D) (Dis)Information Complex (incl. Psyops, COINTELPRO, NLP, MSM)


The Covid tyrants will NOT stand down, they must be removed post-haste.

Posted by State of the Nation - 23. September 2021



Rothschild Bank of London, Rothschild Bank of Berlin, Warburg Bank of Hamburg, Warburg Bank of Amsterdam, Lazard Brothers of Paris, Israel Moses Seif Banks of Italy, Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, Goldman, Sachs of New York, Lehman Brothers of New York, Kuhn Loeb Bank of New York - making up the so-called but privately owned U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and the UNITED NATIONS, a Corporation. The "UN" is a corporation founded in France several years before the United Nations Charter was even created. And here, for your edification, are the Principal Parties of Interest driving the "UN Agenda"----- Current version UN Corp dba World Bank dba FEDERAL RESERVE --- 52% owned by Rothschild Bank of London and Berlin; 8% owned by Lazard Freres Bank of Paris; 8% owned by Israel Moses Seif Bank of Italy, 8% owned by Warburg Bank of Hamburg and Amsterdam; 6% owned by Lehman Brothers of New York; 6% owned by Kuhn Loeb of New York; 6% owned by Chase Manhattan/Rockefeller Bank of New York; 6% owned by Goldman Sachs. (There may be some changes in ownership(s) since this list was compiled, but the above is accurate for the most part.)



... and how criminal GlaxoSmithKline [GSK] operated you must read HERE




First published on BITCHUTE August 28th, 2021.

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First published on BITCHUTE May 9th, 2020.

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Amazing Polly

Amazing Polly

BOOM revelations get bigger as we go along. Stay with me!

Fauci, Event201, Foundations ...and something called the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board. I expose the front organizations covering for the Global Health Mafia.

NYT Coronovirus Fundraiser: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/world/europe/eu-coronavirus-vaccine.html

DZAU bio Ottawa Heart Institute: https://www.ottawaheart.ca/researchers/conferences-events/ottawa-heart-conference/program-and-speakers/dr-victor-dzau-md

GPMB Board of Directors: https://apps.who.int/gpmb/board.html

GPMB publication, Sept 2019: https://apps.who.int/gpmb/assets/annual_report/GPMB_annualreport_2019.pdf

Philanthropy News Digest: Klausner Fauci: https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/gates-foundation-names-new-director-of-global-health-program

Johns Hopkins commissioned by the GPMB: https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/newsroom/center-news/2019/2019-09-18-GPMBreport.html

Event 201 Players List: https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/event201/players/index.html

National Herald: https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/international/why-is-gates-denying-event-201

Fauci Gates Foundation Grand Challenges board: https://gcgh.grandchallenges.org/about/scientific-board

VIDEO: Fauci “No doubt” of surprise outbreak: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DNXGAxGJgQI

CEPI April pledges: https://cepi.net/news_cepi/belgium-and-canada-provide-funding-boost-for-cepis-covid-19-vaccine-research/

VIDEO: Victor Dzau at McGill “School of Population and Global Health: https://www.youtube.com/w..



Men Who Wanted to Be Left Alone

men who wanted to be left alone

The Great Quote: Men Who Wanted to Be Left Alone

The most terrifying force of death, comes from the hands of “Men who wanted to be left Alone”.

They try, so very hard, to mind their own business and provide for themselves and those they love.

They resist every impulse to fight back, knowing the forced and permanent change of life that will come from it.

They know, that the moment they fight back, their lives as they have lived them, are over.

The moment the “Men who wanted to be left Alone” are forced to fight back, it is a small form of suicide. They are literally killing off who they used to be. . . .

Which is why, when forced to take up violence, these “Men who wanted to be left Alone”, fight with unholy vengeance against those who murdered their former lives. They fight with raw hate, and a drive that cannot be fathomed by those who are merely play-acting at politics and terror. TRUE TERROR will arrive at the Left’s door, and they will cry, scream, and beg for mercy . . . . but it will fall upon deaf ears.



PROLOGUE: The schemes are just similar - no matter if you are in a Sicilian village, a city in China or at the UN level. With many parliaments in coerced states under the spell of the criminals  at the IMF/Worldbank and/or the CCP and with most law-courts in these countries being totally compromised, only global CROWD-HUNTING will bring the culprits to justice the crimes against humanity to an end.

Countering Protection Rackets Using Legal and Social Approaches: An Agent-Based Test

Volume 2018 |Article ID 3568085 | https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/3568085

Áron Székely,1,2 Luis G. Nardin,3 and Giulia Andrighetto1,2,4

Guest Editor: Bernardo A. Furtado

Received18 May 2018

Revised20 Aug 2018

Accepted16 Sep 2018

Published02 Dec 2018


Protection rackets cause economic and social damage across the world. States typically combat protection rackets using legal strategies that target the racketeers with legislation, strong sentencing, and increasing the presence and involvement of police officers. Nongovernmental organizations, conversely, focus on the rest of the population and counter protection rackets using a social approach. These organisations attempt to change the actions and social norms of community members with education, promotional campaigns, and discussions. We use an agent-based model, which draws on established theories of protection rackets and combines features of sociological and economic perspectives to modelling social interactions, to test the effects of legal and social approaches. We find that a legal approach is a necessary component of a policy approach, that social only approaches should not be used because they lead to large increases in violence, and that a combination of the two works best, although even this must be used carefully.

1. Introduction

Protection rackets are widespread and can be found in many countries in the world. Although they vary in multiple ways, mafias can be defined as groups that specialise in the production and sale of protection to people and businesses [12]. Put another way, mafias run protection rackets. The Sicilian Mafia [1]—as well as other mafias in Italy [3], the Russian Mafia [245], and the Yakuza [6] may all be considered to be mafias. The protection they provide includes the supply of real, but often illegal, services, whereby the racketeers protect businesses from criminals and legal competition, as well as pure extortion, in which the only “protection” that racketeers provide is from themselves [1]. Ultimately, mafias harm the societies in which they operate. Among the many costs are those that they impose on businesses for maintaining security, the direct costs of crime, the state-level costs to combatting and countering protection rackets, and the help that they provide to criminals and businesses to conduct illegal transactions [713]. While estimates of the costs vary greatly, all agree upon the basic point: the costs of protection rackets are substantial [915]. One study, for instance, estimates that the presence of mafias has lowered GDP growth per capita by 16% in Apulia and Basilicata (regions of Italy) relative to “synthetic controls” [9], while a much more inclusive estimate by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime calculates the crime proceeds of transnational organised crime at $0.9 trillion [16]. Despite the damage caused by protection rackets, they have proven to be resilient. A core difficulty around combatting them is that they comprise a complex system with multiple relevant actors including a state, a mafia (of which there may be multiple competing against each other), shopkeepers and business-people, consumers, nongovernmental organisations, and the rest of society, as well as nonlinear feedback loops between the actions of these actors. Another problem is that it is extremely difficult to conduct experiments on different policies to test their causal effects. Yet, doing so would allow knowledge about effective counter-mafia techniques to accumulate. To understand this usually hidden phenomenon of protection rackets, and test policy approaches to countering them, we use computational tools. This is different from the tools traditionally used in criminology although there are some recent exceptions [1718].

Specifically, our contribution here is to use our agent-based model (ABM) of protection rackets, configured to represent a single neighbourhood in the city of Palermo, to conduct experiments that are relevant to policy, with a focus on the dynamics of social norm change, and discuss the implications of these results for countering protection rackets. We also describe the theoretical grounding of the model. We have presented our model before from a technical perspective in [19], and the simulator underlying the model has been described in [20]. The model, the normative architecture, and some of the results are described in the deliverables of the FP7 EU project GLODERS (deliverables 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4). Some preliminary results are published in a conference proceedings [21] and the model as a book chapter [22]. We use our ABM to ask how effective are laws alone at countering protection rackets? How resilient are any effects that emerge? Are laws sufficient to change social norms and promote a “culture of legality?”. Is a social approach capable of countering protection rackets? Our experimental tests yield insights into the policies that may be effective, the policies that are unlikely to be effective, and the policies that have troubling side effects. They also allow us to consider the resiliency and long-term effects of these approaches.

ABMs allow researchers to observe the social system under study at multiple levels. They can observe agents’ cognitive processes, their individual behaviours, and the patterns of behaviour that emerge from their interactions. As an example of the first level, we could inspect the “minds” of individuals and investigate the dynamics of the expectations and beliefs that support certain behaviours and their change. Such a multilevel investigation is crucial for enriching our understanding of this social phenomenon. ABMs also allow researchers to manipulate variables and run experiments that could not be conducted in real settings. We cannot run field experiments on the different counter-racket approaches, so we test them in our virtual world [17].

The entities in our model are the state, the mafia, business-people (entrepreneurs), the broader population (consumers), and a nongovernmental (NGO) antimafia organisation. We gave these entities rules on how to behave based on the literature in criminology, discussions with organised crime experts (see Validation for details), and information extracted from specialised databases. We then use our ABM to test two common approaches of combatting mafias. To counter protection rackets, governments typically use a top-down legal approach. They enact and enforce legislation, and increase policing and sentencing, in an attempt to imprison mafiosi. Nongovernmental organisations use alternative means. They use a bottom-up social approach to change peoples’ actions through nonlegal means. Often this is aimed to shape the expectations and beliefs of the population about the socially appropriate action to take—“reporting protection racketeers to the police” for instance. In other words, they work on the social norms of a population. Educational and promotional campaigns, communal discussions, and commitment devices—asking to consumers to sign declarations stating that they commit to not buying from pizzo-paying shops, are all tools in the NGO toolkit [2324].

In guiding our ABM development, we draw on two, out of many, theoretical approaches [25]. One approach, which can be found predominantly in the early works on the Sicilian Mafia, emphasises the role of culture in shaping protection rackets and determining behaviour [2631]. Schneider and Schneider [30], for instance, argue that cultural codes celebrating honour, cleverness, and friendship are especially important for understanding the organisation and success of the mafia (p. x). When characterising the mafia too, many of these scholars focus on culture. For them “mafiosi personified a series of attitudes and values, a ‘subculture’ widespread throughout the whole of Sicilian society” [32]. Santoro describes another example of this approach: Pitré “famously argued against the identification of Mafia as a criminal social organization, insisting on its being a diffuse cultural attitude instead” [25]. When these authors make their substantive claims, among them that the Sicilian Mafia is not a united organisation, they employ a cultural focus to elucidate their arguments.

Another, more recent but now-widespread, approach relies on the theoretical framework of economics to explain the features and success of organised crime and mafias. It draws on, among others, “game theory, transaction costs analysis, economic neo-institutionalism” [25] and uses beliefspreferencesand constraints as the core components of its explanations. It provides explanations at the individual level and in terms of people’s decisions. Exemplified in the foundational works of Thomas Schelling [33] and Diego Gambetta [134], this approach draws parallels between protection rackets and businesses. Gambetta, for instance, characterises the Sicilian Mafia as being involved in the industry of private protection and that low levels of trust (the belief that people will cheat other when possible) leads to a demand for protection that is fulfilled by those who are both willing to provide it (based on certain preferences) and are able to do so given their resources.

A fundamental distinction between these two theoretical approaches is in their conception of human nature. The cultural perspective relies on Homo Sociologicus as its model: an “oversocialised conception of man” that presumes people unthinkingly follow the social norms that they have internalised, blindly shifting their actions according to others’ expectations [3536]. Conversely, the economic perspective employs a Homo Economicus view of human nature in which people follow their incentives, often self-interested ones, irrespective of social norms or others disapproval, when deciding what to do [35].

Extensive research now shows that both contain insights. Incentives are fundamental drivers of human behaviour [3740], yet people consider also social factors when deciding how to act (e.g., [354143]). Social norms are one of the most important of these social factors [40]. In addition to the decades of observational studies (e.g., [44]), extensive experimental evidence demonstrates the important influence of social norms on behaviour [4555].

Social norms can be defined as shared behavioural rules proscribing or prescribing certain actions that are followed because of reciprocal expectations and, in some cases, social punishment [515658]. Norms may, in their simplest incarnations, take the forms “do X” or “do not do Y” [37], but they can be more complex and take conditional forms. The expectations motivating norm compliance can be separated into empirical and normative expectations [56]. The former are people’s beliefs about how prevalent a behaviour is, while the latter are people’s beliefs about what others expect them to do. From another perspective, social norms can also be considered as particular components of institutions [59].

Social norms influence many aspects of our lives: shaping how we interact with our family, friends, and strangers [60]. Given that social norms permeate social life, it seems highly likely that they also operate in the domain of protection rackets. There are empirical hints to back up this supposition. Norms of fairness, reciprocity, in-group favouritism, and omertà—a code of silence—are all plausibly important in affecting paying pizzo, money paid by businesses and individuals to mafias in exchange for protection, and reporting pizzo requests to the police (see [61]).

Our model integrates Homo Economicus and Homo Sociologicus. Key agents in our model, entrepreneurs, who represent business people, and consumers, who represent the broader population of citizens, consider both their incentives and social norms when deciding how to act. These decision makers’ utility is based on the economic rewards that they obtain and on the degree to which their actions comply with social norms, in the form of taking actions considered as socially appropriate and avoiding those viewed as socially inappropriate. Ultimately, they weigh up both individual and normative reasons to determine what they do (see also [465462]).

In the past, the empirical basis for social norms, what they are and how they affect behaviour, was weak. In particular, both the measurement of expectations—the drivers of norm-following behaviour, and experimental manipulations to test the causal effects of social norms were lacking. With the advent of more precise measurement and experimental techniques, we are now better able to provide an empirical grounding for social norms [49505456]. Another critique of social norms was that they are vague, ignore cognitive mechanisms, and that they are used as a catch-all term. Using a computer simulation forces us to be explicit and precise about what social norms are and the effects they may have in our model. Our model uses prior work done by scholars who have developed a normative agent architecture, “EMIL-A,” that allows norms to be realistically implemented in a model [57]. It is a cognitively grounded normative agent architecture that provides a measure that indicates how active and prominent, or inactive and inconspicuous, a norm is, the “salience of a norm,” which facilitates the incorporation of normative considerations into the agents’ decision-making processes.

There is a large literature on modelling social norms in the complex systems field as well as in the social sciences. Much of this addresses how cooperation can be promoted with social norms [63]. Schlüter and colleagues [64] consider a common pool resource problem and test how resource abundance and variability influences norm-driven cooperation, while Tessone and coauthors [65] focus on how the distribution of individuals’ sensitivities towards social norms within a population affects norm-following. The latter find that heterogeneity in sensitivity can increase norm-following. Others examine the roots of social norms and test how they emerge [6669]. Some work tests how social structure and access to information about the behaviour of other agents, only those close by or also those more distant, influences norm-following [70]. ABMs of institutions are also related to our work here [71].

The closest existing ABM that specifically addresses protection rackets comes from the work of Troitzsch [7274]. Troitzsch presents an ABM of a protection racket in which he integrates instrumental and normative considerations in the decision-making of agents. Different to ours, Troitzsch’s model is more complex, containing more parameters and processes, and he does not use a calibrated version of it to run policy-relevant experiments. Other related ABMs look at instrumental factors [75], how a team-reasoning approach changes entrepreneurs’ willingness to resist [76], and whether presence of fakers, who pose as mafiosi but are unwilling to use violence towards nonpaying shopkeepers, changes the protection racket dynamic [77].

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Model Overview

Our event-based agent-based model is configured to represent a single neighbourhood of Palermo in which a mafia runs a protection racket and hence we call it the Palermo Scenario. We built our agent-based model as part of the FP7 EU funded project GLODERS. This project included more than twenty domain experts from multiple European countries allowing us to use an iterative participatory modelling approach to construct the model, identify the main actors, and validate the model’s assumptions, dynamics, and outcomes. We identified entrepreneurs, the state, the Sicilian Mafia, consumers, and nongovernmental organisations as key players in the dynamics of protection rackets and implemented these as the agents (Figure 1). This was based on the iterative participatory modelling process with the domain experts and evidence that we extracted from a range of sources including judicial and confiscated mafia documents, academic studies, and newspapers and television interviews. We draw on the model description we previously used in [19] for this section; see also the same paper for technical details of the model. We present an ODD+D (Overview, Design Concepts, and Details + Decision) document [78] concerning our model in Table S1 of the Supplementary Information.

Figure 1 

Schematic of the agents in the Palermo Scenario and their dynamics. Boxes represent agent types and arrows represent actions.

Entrepreneurs represent businessmen and the self-employed. They sell products to consumers and receive an income periodically. They face the decisions to pay pizzo, or not, if approached by mafiosi (pay); report pizzo requests to the state if they decide not to pay pizzo (report); report any damages to the state that they sustained from mafiosi attacks (report); collaborate with the state against specific mafiosi following a request by the state (collaborate); and join the NGO to signal that they are unwilling to pay pizzo and likely to report pizzo requests and punishments (join). Entrepreneurs and consumers are connected to each other in a static scale-free network [79] that is defined at the start of the simulation. This network defines their range of perceptions regarding others’ actions and it is used to update their normative behaviour.

Consumers represent people buying goods from shops. Consumers have a single decision regarding which entrepreneur to buy a product from (buy), restricted to their neighbour entrepreneurs in the defined scale-free network. Consumers also spread information through this network that can influence other consumers and entrepreneurs and serve as reservoirs of normative behaviours (social norm spreading).

The state represents the government and its institutions that are responsible for enforcing antiracket laws. It is composed of police officers who try to detect pizzo requests and imprison mafiosi based on general or specific investigations (investigate). General and specific investigations differ in how they are initiated, their duration, and the probability of success. General investigations, which may be thought of as a patrol, occur on an ongoing basis without specific evidence. As such, they have a short duration—allowing police officers to explore more space—but have a low probability of success. In contrast, specific investigations are initiated based on evidence and reports by entrepreneurs, thus justifying the use of resources for a longer period as they have a higher probability of success. Imprisoned mafiosi are removed from the simulation for a set amount of time. After the police capture a mafioso, they may find information about the entrepreneurs who paid pizzo to that mafioso—some mafiosi keep accounting books to record information about pizzo payers. The state can then use this evidence to elicit collaboration from those entrepreneurs (collaborate). If collaboration is obtained, the state uses the collected information to prosecute that mafioso. If collaboration is not obtained, the state may, with a small probability, fine entrepreneurs. The state can also support entrepreneurs who have suffered damages at the hands of mafiosi (assist). Entrepreneurs may apply for monetary support from a fund that periodically recharges and is specifically set up for this purpose. In Italy, this fund is known as the “Fondo di Solidarietà.” The state also spreads information about successful actions that it has carried out against the mafia: consider this as the state providing information to journalists who report and propagate the news in newspapers and television programs (social norm spreading), and it can work to change people’s social norms regarding the mafia by sponsoring and supporting antiracket festivals (social norm spreading). The Festival della Legalità is one example of the state supporting antiracket festivals.

The mafia represents a “family” covering a neighbourhood and is composed of mafiosi who request pizzo from entrepreneurs (request) and provide benefits, which we intend as a simple representation of protection, to pizzo-paying entrepreneurs (benefit). Mafiosi can also punish nonpaying and reporting entrepreneurs. Since they are part of the same family, mafiosi coordinate their actions—whom they target, how often they request pizzo, how much they request, and how severely they punish (punish). Mafiosi can, with a small probability, turn informant and help the state capture other mafiosi that they know (collaborate).

The model mafia in our setup is intended to represent the post-1990s Sicilian Mafia. Following a change in leadership from Totò Riina to Bernardo Provenzano, and protests by parts of the Sicilian population over their public execution of government officials, the mafia undertook a “hidden” strategy in which they limit obvious violent retaliations and request modest pizzo from a greater proportion of the population (see Table S2 for the parameters used).

The NGO represents an antiracket nongovernmental organisation. We primarily draw on Addiopizzo (“goodbye pizzo”) for our model NGO and we go into more detail about this organisation in Section 3.1. It promotes lawful behaviour among consumers and entrepreneurs through events such as talks in schools or the organisation of and participation in festivals (social norm spreading). The civil society organisation Libera is the main organiser of the aforementioned Festival della Legalità. The NGO spreads information depending on the number of actions the state takes against the mafia and the number of extortive actions shared by the affiliated entrepreneurs. It serves as an organisation that entrepreneurs can join if they are not paying pizzo.

2.2. Decision-Making

Agents can be separated into two groups based on their decision-making complexity. The state, the mafia, and the NGO are represented as agents whose decisions are based on fixed probabilities initialised at the start of the simulation. In contrast, entrepreneurs and consumers use more sophisticated reasoning abilities. They base their choices on a combination of instrumental and social considerations.

Instrumental considerations approximate instrumental rationality. They involve strict cost-benefit calculations that motivate agents to take decisions that maximise their own material pay-offs, independently of what a certain norm dictates. Exactly what factors are considered depends on the agent and on the decision being made. For instance, when deciding whether to pay pizzo or not, entrepreneurs consider the cost of paying pizzo, the potential benefit received from paying, the anticipated violence from the mafia to not paying, and the ability of the state to identify pizzo-paying entrepreneurs and the resulting fine.

Social considerations represent the agents’ motivations to comply with a norm. The parameter considered is the “salience of a norm.” It refers to a measure that indicates how active and prominent, or inactive and inconspicuous, a norm is within a group in a given context. It is a function of how important agents believe norms to be and it approximates in a single value the combined empirical and normative expectations that agents have about a norm. Norm salience is updated by each agent based on its own behaviour (whether it followed the norm or not), the information gathered by observing the behaviour of and actions inflicted on neighbouring agents (whether others followed the norm or not) and normative information spread by the state and NGO (see also [4662]).

2.3. Social and Legal Norms

Social norms in our model are implemented using the agent architecture EMIL-A [57], an architecture specifically designed to capture the complex dynamics of social norms. Agents that possess normative reasoning modules (entrepreneurs and consumers) in our model can recognise social norms and decide to comply with the social norm.

Recognition entails that agents discriminate between whether others’ behaviour is driven by, at least in part, the existence of a social norm and if this is the case, to subsequently form a belief concerning that norm. This belief may simply state that the norm exists or it may be more complex and include the further specifications that the norm is applicable to the belief-holding agent who recognised it, and potentially, that the norm is supported by rewards or punishments.

Following recognition, agents adopt a norm and decide whether to comply with it. Compliance means here that the goals of agents are potentially turned into action. Turning a goal into an action however depends on both the normative goal and instrumental considerations. A key part of the decision-making process that determines the influence of social norms on behaviour is social norm salience. This represents the importance that agents place on a social norm and is determined by multiple factors including observed compliance, observed violation, and observed and applied punishments. For details, (see [19], Section 5.4).

The specific social norms we include for entrepreneurs are pay pizzo requests, do not pay pizzo requests, report pizzo requests, and do not report pizzo request. We explicitly represent both a norm and its opposite norm for entrepreneurs, such as pay pizzo and do not pay pizzo, because this allows us to model a greater space of normative situations than if we were to make them complementary. We can represent situations in which the norm of pay pizzo and do not pay pizzo are both low in salience, in which case there are weak or no social norms associated with paying pizzo, or that they are both high in which case there is internal normative conflict within agents. Although these social norms are aimed to capture the mafia-relevant features of the reciprocity, fairness, in-group favouritism, and omertà, they are not meant to relate in a one-to-one way with the norms that occur in reality. Rather, they summarise and capture the effects of those norms that are relevant to the protection racket. The effects of norms of fairness, for instance, are summarised in the salience the four social norms of entrepreneurs.

Consumers also have one social norm: to avoid pizzo-paying entrepreneurs. This is a norm that is not yet widespread nor established in Sicily, but there is some suggestion that it is growing. We do not include the opposite norm, to choose pizzo-paying entrepreneurs, because we could not find evidence that this exists in Sicily or Palermo. We also include legislation in the model that primarily works by targeting mafiosi. All these norms are summarised below (Table 1).

Table 1 

Social and legal norms in the Palermo Scenario.

It is worth mentioning that our implementation captures an important feature of real social norms. It allows social norms to simultaneously exist, contained within agents’ minds, yet remain latent in a population without being manifested as behaviour [515659]. It may be that everybody within a population abandons a norm; however, since agents know about this, they keep monitoring how salient it is within their community. Consequently, it is possible that social norm consistent behaviour emerges or reemerges.

2.4. Validation

We built the model using an iterative participatory modelling process. This means that we presented the model to people with antimafia expertise, they gave us feedback, we updated the model, and then at a later stage, we presented them the model again. This process gives the agents and model dynamics prima facie validity. In addition, we used participatory modelling as a “powerful tool that can (a) enhance the stakeholders’ knowledge and understanding of a system and its dynamics under various conditions, as in collaborative learning and (b) identify and clarify the impacts of solutions to a given problem, usually related to supporting decision-making, policy, regulation, or management” ([80], see also [81]). Ultimately, an iterative participatory modelling approach increases the benefits that can be derived from the model to both policymakers and researchers.

Although the iterative participatory validation approach is an important piece of specifying a general protection racket simulation model—as well as increasing the relevance of the model, it does not validate the model for a specific protection racket, e.g., the Sicilian Mafia. To do this, we compare whether the model’s outputs match data already acquired from the real system (known as replicative validity or retrodiction) [82]. Zeigler [82] distinguishes between three types (or levels) of validity for this purpose: replicative validity means that the model matches data already acquired from the real system (also known as retrodiction); predictive validity means that the model matches data before the data are acquired from the real system; and structural validity means that the model is not only capable of replicating the observed real system behaviour but reflects exactly the sequence of steps the real system operates to produce this behaviour. Structural validity can almost never be accomplished, especially in models that represent individuals who are reluctant to communicate about their motivations and behaviour propensities. In these circumstances, one will never uncover how real individuals operate to produce their behaviour in sufficient detail. Predictive validity is also difficult to accomplish due to this same issue in which one would not have enough detail about the behaviours to consistently reproduce them in yet unknown future circumstances. However, if we succeed in finding simulation output which is in line with relevant statistics, we can claim that our model is replicatively valid—but this has no direct consequences for its predictive and, more so, for its structural validity. We undertake replicative validation by comparing the model’s outputs to historical trends in Sicily and to contemporary empirical data collected from police records and judicial trials as well as surveys. By applying this approach, we validate our model in two further ways.

Our first approach is to compare the qualitative patterns observed in the model to historical trends reported from Sicily (for further details of this validation, see [19]). To do this, we group the relevant historical periods into five categories: pre-1980s, 1980 to early 1990s, early 1990s to mid 1990s, mid 1990s to 2000, and post-2000. We draw on historical information to qualitatively set up the model’s parameters and then we run the model for 50,000 time units. At every 10,000 time units, we shift the parameter setup to match that drawn from the historical literature and carry over the information from the prior time units. This provides a continuity to the simulation. Each 10,000 time units thus corresponds to a historical time period (time units are not intended to correspond on a 1 : 1 basis with real time. Instead, the 10,000 time units per historical period were chosen to allow changes to stabilise before the model’s parameters are changed). We repeated the simulation, for the purposes of validation, 10 times to ensure that the results are robust.

We find results that are broadly consistent with the trends from these periods in Sicily. Pre-1980s, the governmental authorities did not have effective laws to fight the Sicilian Mafia. So, the mafia could proliferate and use violence against entrepreneurs without fear of strong reactions from the authorities, resulting in a high number of pizzo requests and pizzo paid [83]. During the 1980 to early 1990s, several antimafia laws were implemented enabling the state to effectively fight against mafia (Rognoni-La Torre law; law n. 646, 1982; law n. 8, 1991; law n. 82, 1991; law n. 44, 1999; law n. 512, 1999). This reduced the absolute number of pizzo payments, but increased the amount of damage and violence against entrepreneurs who did not pay [84]. From the early 1990s to mid-1990s, however, the Sicilian Mafia changed its strategy by reducing violence and the amount of pizzo requested, thus being less visible and avoiding imprisonment [8486]. However, the level of pizzo reporting did not increase in these periods because the population’s social norms were not changed. In the mid-1990s to 2000, the improvement in legislation has been highly effective at imprisoning mafiosi (see law n. 356, 1992), seizing their properties (see law n. 109, 1996; law n. 296, 2006; law n. 92, 2008; law n. 40, 2010), and creating the conditions for the emergence and thriving of civil society organisations. In this period, several nongovernmental organisations began to operate and to raise awareness of the importance of reporting extortion to the authorities. This change on the population mind-set increased the number of reports helping the authorities to fight the mafia. Later, the state also started to raise awareness on the population helping to increase even further the proportion of reports and investigations successes.

The second validation approach we take is to compare the output pattern of our model to contemporary empirical data extracted from police reports and court trials that indirectly gives us information on the Sicilian Mafia. This empirical data is a database of more than 600 cases of extortion in Sicily and Calabria during the past decade (database available at https://doi.org/10.7802/1116). For this validation, the percentages of unreported cases (i.e., cases where the police got to know about an extortion without the help of the victim) and the percentages of completed extortions (i.e., not only attempted, but also unsuccessful) that took place in Palermo were calculated.

We calibrate some of the input parameters using data concerning Southern Italy and the surrounding islands that are extracted from surveys such as the European Values Study (European Values Study data is available at https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu). Using this survey data, Troitzsch [87] estimates that the population in Southern Italy has individual weight of 0.41 and normative weight of 0.59, which implies that people in this region are highly sensitive to norms—even more so than individual factors. We use the ordering, a greater weight on normative than individual factors, reported by Troitzsch, but fine-tune the weights by comparing the outputs of our model with data observed in Palermo. We find that the weights of 0.2 and 0.8, respectively, for the individual and normative weight, replicate the data observed in Palermo well and thus use these. However, to check whether our results depend on these weights, we also run our model with an individual weight of 0.41 and a normative weight of 0.59 and find that the substantive results remain the same (see Figures S14 in the Supplementary Information).

Given the fact that the empirical data do not cover all parameters of the model due to the secretive nature of protection rackets, we cannot use traditional validation methods in which empirical data is extensively used. Instead, we let input parameters randomly vary, run our simulation model multiple times varying these parameter values at each run, and we then compare the outcomes of the simulation with the trends of empirical data. If they match, we can claim that our model is replicatively valid and calibrated.

Therefore, we run our model 400 times varying multiple input parameter values (i.e., the state’s frequency and duration of general investigations, probability of accepting to conduct and duration of specific investigations, probability to capture and convict mafiosi, and duration of imprisonment and the mafia’s pizzo amount request, probability, and severity of punishment or benefit) and compare the outcomes with the empirical data collected in several cities in Sicily concerning the percentages of unreported cases (i.e., the number of extortions that were identified by the police through independent investigations, so never reported, divided by the total number of extortions) and the percentages of completed extortions (i.e., the number of extortions paid to the mafia divided by the number of extortion requests). Figure 2 shows that the percentage of unreported cases and completed extortions generated with our model (black plus “+” signs) closely reproducing the outcomes observed in Palermo as the Palermo empirical data (red square) lies within the cloud formed by the simulation outcomes. These results indicate that our model is calibrated to represent the protection racket characteristics observed in Palermo more than in other city in Sicily.

Figure 2 

Comparison between empirical data of different cities in Sicily and simulated data. Simulated data shown in black while survey data shown in red.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. Treatments and Research Questions

We test three treatments in the Palermo Scenario and compare them against a baselinesetup (B). The treatments are a legal approach (LA), a social approach (SA), and a combined approach (CA). For the specific parameters used in our treatments, see Table S2. Our core research question is what are the independent and combined effects of legal and social approaches on the mafia and the rest of the population?

States typically use legal approaches to combat organised crime (this is represented by our LA treatment). These rely on the institutions of the state to identify, prosecute, and incarcerate people running protection rackets. Their targets, in an ideal system, are only criminals. In Italy, the government introduced specific laws that allow mafiosi to be prosecuted and help victims and increased police presence and sent special investigators to direct the antimafia efforts, for instance, General Carlo Alberto Della Chiesa during the Second Mafia War (see [89]) into Sicily. The crime of mafia association was introduced by the Rognoni-La Torre law n. 646 of 13/9/1982 along with the possibility of confiscating mafia properties with their consequent social reuse. In addition, law n. 8 of 15/01/1991 and law n. 82 of 15/03/1991 aim at providing denouncing incentives and protecting victims who report extortion activities. Finally, law n. 44 of 23/02/1999 and law n. 512 of 22/12/1999, respectively, introduced economic support to victims of extortions and the solidarity fund for victims of mafia crimes and intimidation (see [88] for details). Here, we test if this approach works to imprison mafiosi and reduce the activity of mafia, as expected, and whether it has any effects on the behaviour and social norms of the population. Moreover, we explore whether a LA has resilient effects (see below for an explanation of how we test the resilience of the treatments).

While a social strategy is typically used by NGOs, in recent years, the Italian state also supports these social initiatives through festivals (e.g., Festival della Legalità), education campaigns, and strongly publicized successful antimafia operations. We include this pathway in our model. In Italy, a number of NGOs use such an approach, among them, Addiopizzo, Fondazione Rocco Chinnici, Libera, and Professionisti Liberi. Consider the approaches used by Addiopizzo to combat the mafia [2324]. They (i) certify shops as pizzo-free and provide them with a visible indicator of their certification allowing shopkeepers to reliably signal their opposition to the paying pizzo, (ii) condemn mafia activity in the media, (iii) educate schoolchildren in various campaigns, and (iv) collect signatures from consumers in which they declare that they will avoid pizzo-paying shops. The expectation is that these activities will change the social norms and behaviours of the population thereby indirectly undermining the mafia. Will this be borne out in our model? And is this approach resilient to exogenous shocks?

Combined approaches use both legal and social strategies to counter protection rackets. They employ the traditional institutional tools of the state to capture and imprison mafiosi, and, they add a bottom-up norm-change strategy that targets citizens. This two-pronged approach to targeting mafias, with both legal and cultural sides, is an approach that is advocated for among scholars by Godson and coauthors [9091] and by Orlando, the current, and previous, mayor of Palermo [89]. They argue that the development of a “culture of lawfulness” is a crucial factor in fighting organised crime.

“Bolstered by a sympathetic culture ‘culture of lawfulness’ law enforcement and regulatory systems function more effectively in myriad ways. Those who transgress the rules find themselves targeted not only by law enforcement but also by many sectors of society. Community support and involvement can also focus on preventing and on rooting out criminal and corrupt practices without the need for expenditures for a massive law enforcement and punitive establishment. This involvement also reduces the risk and expense of intrusive government surveillance and regulatory practices harmful to individual liberties and creative economic, social, and political initiatives” [90].

We put this idea to the test: will a combined approach perform best?

We compare these three approaches to a baseline setup. This setup represents a state of affairs in which the state almost entirely lacks a legal approach and there is no social approach at all. It is used as an experimental control.

Almost all systems, states and NGOs, use some combination of social and legal approaches to reduce crime, and, where applicable protection rackets. So, this is an important approach to test. The reason we also explore social and legal approaches in isolation is to see the causal effect that these “extreme” strategies would lead to and to contrast it with that of the combined approach. Because of this reasoning, we test a pure legal approach in which there is no campaigning or information promotion by the state or NGO. When testing the social approach, we leave a weak legal backing in place: this is because it is never the case that a state has no legal approach entirely. Were this to be the case, the “state” would cease to be a state in that area.

To test the causal effect and robustness of each treatment, we run the Palermo Scenario for 10,000 time units and then revert the parameters of the simulation to the B setup and continue to run the simulation for a further 10,000 time units. With this approach, we test the average treatment effect with the initial 10,000 time units and the stability of the results that arise from each of the different approaches by comparing the second 10,000 time units. We then repeat the simulation 30 times for each treatment to give us a robust average of the results. The simulation has 100 entrepreneurs, 200 consumers, 20 mafiosi, 1 NGO, and 1 state agent. The state has 20 police officers. For simplicity, the number of each type of agents remains fixed throughout the simulation (e.g., there are always 20 mafiosi in the simulation).

3.2. Findings

To understand what happens in the different treatments, we consider the following outcomes: the imprisonment of mafiosi, the efficiency of the state at imprisoning mafiosi, pizzo requests and punishments meted out by the mafia, pizzo paying and reporting by entrepreneurs, and the social norm saliences of entrepreneurs. The model outcomes we refer to are always averages of the 30 repetitions aggregated by 1000 time units because our model is based on an event-based rather than a time-step approach.

Consider the ability of the state to imprison mafiosi. In both the B and the SA, very few mafiosi are incarcerated (3/20 and 5/20 on average, respectively), while in the LA and the CA, around 65% (13/20) are incarcerated (Figure 3(a)). None of the effects on increased imprisonment are really robust. After the change in parameters, LA and SA tend to converge with the B treatment, although the CA retains some capacity to imprison over the baseline.



Figure 3 

Mafia imprisonment. Means plotted and error bars indicate ±1 standard deviation. (a) The number of mafiosi (out of 20) imprisoned in each treatment and (b) proportion of investigations that are specific investigations. The dashed line indicates the change to baseline parameters.

While the LA and CA end up imprisoning a similar number of mafiosi, they do so in very different ways (Figure 3(b)). The LA achieves this solely through general investigations—the police conducting their routine antimafia activity. While the CA attains a substantial percentage of its imprisonments through specific investigations. This suggests that the CA is more efficient at imprisoning mafiosi since it can target them based on information it receives from entrepreneurs. The BA, similar to the LA, uses no specific investigation and there are very few mafiosi whom it imprisons, while the SA, even though the state pursues specific investigations, leads to little imprisonment.

Pizzo requests are substantively affected by the different policies (Figure 4(a)). The LA and the CA hugely decrease the number of pizzo requests that entrepreneurs are approached with relative to the B. However, there is little resilience to the LA but some resilience to the CA following a change to B parameters. The SA has a small effect on reducing the number of pizzo requests.



Figure 4 

Actions of the mafia. Means plotted and error bars indicate ±1 standard deviation. The number of (a) pizzo requests made by mafiosi and (b) punishments inflicted upon entrepreneurs. The dashed line indicates the change to baseline parameters.

Particularly interesting is the treatments’ effects on punishment (Figure 4(b)). The SA, in the first 10,000 time units, strongly increases the number of punishments that entrepreneurs receive. Employing only a SA leads to increased violence relative to the B treatment. This is because Entrepreneurs increase their refusal to pay pizzo, yet because they lack state support, in the form of strong counter-mafia measures, they are punished for their resistance. Conversely, the LA and the CA both reduce violence to a lower level even than in the B.

Following the change in parameters back to the baseline setup, violence returns to baseline levels in the LA treatment, but in the SA, the harmful effects are maintained, while in the CA, harmful effects emerge. Punishment in the CA becomes higher than in the B and worst of all, in terms of punishment is the SA. Two factors drive this: entrepreneurs not paying and reporting pizzo requests in the SA and CA combined with the inability of the state to imprison mafiosi (Figures 5(a) and 5(b)). As mafiosi are released from prison in the CA, punishment rapidly rise.



Figure 5 

Entrepreneurs’ actions. Means plotted and error bars indicate ±1 standard deviation. The (a) proportion of pizzo requests paid and (b) reported in each treatment. The dashed line indicates the change to baseline parameters.

Given the persistence with which our model citizens report mafiosi and refuse to pay pizzo despite the punishments that they receive in the SA, one may wonder whether the high punishment finding would extend to the real world. As mentioned before, we consider this, as well as the LA, to be extreme tests. Yet, we think that the core finding, a higher level of punishment than in the other treatments, would be found also in reality. Even if the extent to which it occurs is lower, the lack of state support, coupled with some reporting and refusal to pay pizzo would increase punishment.

Entrepreneurs in the B treatment pay pizzo the greatest percentage of the time (Figure 5(a)). The LA has no effect on reducing pizzo payment relative to B (79% are paid in both), while the SA and the CA reduce pizzo payment substantially to 49% and 54%, respectively (it is unclear whether the difference in pizzo paying between SA and CA is meaningful. There are reasons to be sceptical: it is small, likely to decrease in longer simulations—much of it arises in the first 5000 time units, and it essentially disappears with different individual and normative weights (see Figure S3A). Moreover, the effects of the treatments are largely resilient to the change to the baseline parameters. This implies that the changes brought about in pizzo payment by the SA and CA are robust. Later, we show that this is down to changes in social norms (see Figure 6).





Figure 6 

Social norm importance in the population. Means plotted and error bars indicate ±1 standard deviation. Saliences of the social norm (a) pay pizzo, (b) do not pay pizzo, (c) report pizzo, and (d) do not report pizzo. The dashed line indicates the change to baseline parameters.

A greater proportion of pizzo requests are reported in the CA (10.7% on average) and the SA (10.9%) than in the LA (0.2%) and the B (0.2%) (Figure 5(b)). So, the CA and the SA are the most effective at eliciting cooperation from citizens. And the LA is entirely ineffective. Interestingly, the SA is comparable to the CA in increasing reporting also in its resilience: after 10,000 time units reporting in the SA increases to 12.8%, while in the CA, it increases to 16.3%. The effects of the SA and CA treatments are maintained, and even increased, after the parameters return to the B levels.

Consider now the social norms for paying and not paying pizzo. In the B, the social norm salience for paying pizzo decreases slightly from the starting level and stabilises (average of 89.2%; Figure 6(a)), while the salience of not paying pizzo remains stable at an average of 6.8% (Figure 6(b)). The norm saliences for both norms in the LA follow the same pattern. In contrast, the salience of the norm for paying pizzo decreases strongly (average of 53.7% in the SA and 60.2% in the CA) and the salience of the norm do not pay pizzo increases strongly (average of 51.2% in the SA and 44.4% in the CA) in the SA and the CA (Figures 6(a) and 6(b)). All these effects are resilient to the change in parameters that occurs after 10,000 time units.

Following closely the pattern observed for pay pizzo and do not pay pizzo, we find that the saliences for the norms report pizzo and do not report pizzo in the B and the LA are very similar (Figures 6(c) and 6(d)). The norm salience for reporting pizzo remains stable at the low level of 2.3% in the B and 4.2% in the LA and the norm salience remains high at 97.2% in the B and 96.4% in the LA. The SA and the CA are able to change the norms to make them less mafia supporting (Figures 6(c) and 6(d)). In both treatments, the norm salience of report pizzo increases to around 40% (average of 39.6% in the SA and 37.5% in the CA) and the do not report pizzo goes below the 50% level for the SA and approaches that level in the CA (average of 44.6% in the SA and 58.2% in the CA). The treatment effects are unaffected by the change in parameters at 10,000 time units.

Social norms remain stable even after the change in parameters at 10,000 time units because once they have been built up, they are difficult to change. It is particularly difficult to change them through punishment by mafiosi since this has a low weight in the norm salience calculation relative to the observation of other entrepreneurs’ actions. Additionally, the actions of entrepreneurs influence norm salience in the opposite direction to the punishment of mafiosi making their net effect on social norm salience small.

Concerning norm diffusion and change, we ultimately find that norms, whether good or bad, are unaffected by a B or LA approach. Instead, social norms are strongly changed with a SA or CA approach. Interestingly, a social only approach, SA, diffuses and changes norms faster than a combined approach. This counterintuitive result is a consequence of an increase on extortion-related actions—pizzo requests and punishments due to more free mafiosi—which causes the NGO to increase the promotion of lawful behaviour among the population. It is also a finding that holds when we use individual and normative weights of 0.41 and 0.59 (see Figure S4).

4. Conclusion

Our agent-based model combines elements of both cultural and economic approaches to understanding protection rackets, in part, by modelling agents that combine core features of Homo Sociologicus and Homo Economicus. This implementation allows us to represent realistic aspects of cultural and normative transmission and influence. Agents are capable of enacting cultural change by affecting each other’s behaviour through changes in the strength of social norms and agent’s actions shape culture and culture simultaneously shapes agent’s decisions.

Using the model, we then test widespread approaches that policymakers and law-enforcement agencies employ to counter protection rackets. Simulations of social, legal, and combined approaches in our model world have uncovered a range of relevant findings.

Start with the legal approach: the standard tool in the antimafia toolkit of agencies and governments. We find that the LA approach dramatically increases the state’s capability to imprison mafiosi (although not its efficiency in achieving this). Consequently, requests for pizzo and punishment received by citizens are greatly reduced. Thus, such antimafia efforts lead to strong and direct results.

The LA, however, fails to change how compliant citizens are to the mafia: the proportion of entrepreneurs paying pizzo and reporting remain the same as in the baseline. Additionally, the LA does not change social norm and the benefits that it produces lack resilience. These findings imply that if a state reduces its antimafia efforts, say, due to a decrease in resources or a change in political agenda, then the gains that it previously made are lost. For these reasons, a legal only approach is not an ideal, nor a long-lasting, anti-mafia tool.

Next, consider the strategy utilised by NGOs: the social approach. This approach changes citizens’ behaviours and social norms for the better. Entrepreneurs decrease the proportion of pizzo that they pay, increase their reporting of mafiosi to the tate, and their social norms become less supportive of the mafia. These positive changes are robust and remain even after the SA is abandoned.

Yet the SA has flaws. The approach barely increases the number of mafiosi in prison and the efficiency with which the state puts them there. Because of the former, the number of pizzo requests made to entrepreneurs decreases only a little. Although one could expect that decreased support and increased reporting among citizens leads to distributed enforcement, thereby imprisoning mafiosi and reducing pizzo requests, this is not the case. The lesson to draw is that without state support, reporting by citizens is largely ineffective.

Worst of all, the lack of support from the state leads to large increases in violence. This is the fatal problem of the SA approach: it substantially increases the number of punishments that mafiosi inflict on citizens. It does this to a higher level than in all the other treatments. And, even after the SA approach is stopped, the increase in violence remains. In other words, initiating the policy increases violence straightaway and stopping the policy does not revert punishments to baseline levels. For this reason, a pure SA is dangerous and not a viable antimafia policy.

The final approach we look at combines the legal and social approaches simultaneously. The CA also leads to a higher number of mafiosi being imprisoned and it increases the efficiency with which the state imprisons mafiosi. Although the number of mafiosi that the state imprisons in the CA is similar to the number that it imprisons in the LA, the former approach is more efficient at achieving the same outcome since it relies on targeted investigations for the job. This means that a state operating with a CA, in real-world terms, spends fewer resources to achieve the same level of imprisonment as a state using only a LA.

Other benefits created by the CA are that it reduces pizzo requests, punishments, and pizzo payment and increases reporting to the state. The CA also changes the social norms of entrepreneurs to make them less mafia supporting.

Some of the effects of the CA are robust: the increase in specific investigations, the reduction in pizzo payment, the increase in reporting, and the change in social norms are all resilient. These changes last even after the approach is reverted back to the baseline. To a much smaller degree, the increase in mafia in prison and the reduction in pizzo requests all retain some resilience.

There is however a drawback of the CA. Surprisingly, once the CA is removed, and the parameters are reverted to the baseline, punishments against Entrepreneurs increase. This increase is nearly as high as that which occurs in the SA following a reversion to the baseline. Using the CA and then abandoning it lead to high levels of violence.

Overall, the CA has many benefits. It imprisons mafiosi the most efficiently, and it changes citizens’ behaviours and social norms for the better. Moreover, some of these beneficial changes are resilient. Yet, it has one important failing: preemptively stopping the CA leads to high levels of violence against entrepreneurs. If a state starts a combined approach, it needs to fundamentally undermine a mafia before it decreases its counter-mafia efforts.

We can summarise the main findings from our model as follows:(1)Legal approaches are necessary components of an effective antimafia strategy. Without legal backing, antimafia efforts fail(2)Purely social approaches should be avoided. Small advantages are more than offset by the increase in punishment and violence towards citizens(3)Combined approaches are the most powerful antimafia tools(4)Combined approaches should not be stopped prematurely, before the mafia is essentially defeated, because this leads to high levels of violence

It is worth reiterating an unexpected but troubling finding. The most violent situations are those in which entrepreneurs are convinced to change their behaviour by the state and the NGO but are not supported by legal power. This is because in these configurations, entrepreneurs partially change their behaviour but, since they are not supported by the state, are subject to high levels of punishments and retaliation by the mafia. This occurs directly in the SA and in the CA after the policy is stopped. A clear policy recommendation can be drawn from this: states should ensure that any social change initiatives are sufficiently supported by legal backing and that such combined approaches should be used until mafias are overcome. The crucial part of this recommendation is the last one: combined approaches should not be prematurely stopped as this could lead to large outbreaks of violence.

From the perspective of nonstate actors, a possible policy implication is that NGOs should only work carefully and to a limited extent and avoid directly challenging protection rackets when governments are weak. Conversely, when governments are strong, NGOs can be bolder in their counter-mafia steps and change the population norms.

Our findings need to be accompanied with a number of caveats. First, although our model is complex, it still is only a model of reality. Empirical tests are essential to check whether its predictions hold in the real world. Second, the mafia in our setup is configured as a marginally exploitative organisation. Entrepreneurs pay slightly more to the mafia than the benefits that they receive in return. This setup captures important cases in which the state is providing effective protection and the protection from a genuine protection-providing mafia is unnecessary and somewhat costly. Alternatively, it may be that the mafia is somewhat parasitic, irrespective of the state’s protection provisioning. What it does not capture is the situation in which the mafia provide genuine protection that is useful to many entrepreneurs, which, as Gambetta [1] and Varese [92] write, is undoubtedly true in some cases. Thus, our results may not apply to a mafia type organisation that entrepreneurs prefer to pay. Third, even in the best-case configurations, the majority of entrepreneurs pay pizzo, and only minority of them ever choose to report. Moreover, entrepreneurs’ social norms are only just reversed regarding pizzo paying and not reporting, from mafia supporting to antimafia, and their social norms for reporting are never reversed. Putting these caveats to one side, our results are fairly encouraging regarding the possibility of overcoming protection rackets using a combination of top-down legal and bottom-up social approaches.

Our simulation demonstrates how complex and hard-to-study social problems such as protection rackets can be fruitfully addressed using an ABM. Simulations may have substantial untapped benefits in studying hidden and dangerous phenomena and have relevance to policy development in constantly changing environments. Our model has allowed us to understand the relative benefits that different counter-mafia public policies may yield as well as their longer-term resilience. We have also been able to explore the dynamics of norm change within a population and identify policies that may be effective, ineffective, and harmful.

Data Availability

The simulation code and data are available on the OSF at https://osf.io/f34mh/. The model implementation is also available at https://github.com/LABSS/gloderss.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper.


We wish to thank Francesco Calderoni, Nicolas Payette, and Mario Paolucci for their insightful comments and suggestions. This work was partially supported by the FP7-ICT Science of Global Systems program (no.: 315874), the Knut and Wallenberg Grant “How do human norms form and change?” (2016.0167), and the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme Project PROTON “Modelling the Processes leading to Organised crime and Terrorist Networks” (No.: 699824).

Supplementary Materials

Additional tables are provided in the Supplementary Information. Table S1 is an ODD + D protocol for the Palermo Scenario. Table S2 contains a full list of the initial parameter values of the model and indicates the parameter values that are changed for the different treatments. (Supplementary Materials)


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